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ARTICLES
MANDATORY RULES
Scott Dodson*
Whether a limitation is jurisdictional or not is an important but often
obscure question. In an article published in Northwestern University Law
Review, I proposed a framework for courts to resolve the issue in a principled
way, but I left open the next logical question: what does it mean if a rule is
characterized as nonjurisdictional? Jurisdictional rules generally have a clearly
defined set of traits: they are not subject to equitable exceptions, consent, waiver,
or forfeiture; they can be raised at any time; and they can be raised by any party
or the court sua sponte. This jurisdictional rigidity has led courts and
commentators to overlook the fact that nonjurisdictional rules need not be the
mirror inverse but may instead have attributes commonly associated with
jurisdictionality. A nonjurisdictional rule might, for example, be “mandatory,”
meaning that it is subject to waiver or forfeiture, but if properly raised by the
party for whose benefit it lies, it has the jurisdictional-like attribute of being
immune to equitable exceptions. This Article is the first to take a hard look at
nonjurisdictional rules and, particularly, “mandatory” rules. It first argues that
they have an important institutional role to play in our procedural system. It then
shows that, in practice, mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterizations may
help explain a number of perplexing doctrines. As an example, the Article
demonstrates how such a characterization can help reconcile the convoluted
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Ultimately, the Article suggests that a
greater appreciation for mandatory rules both can benefit the procedural system
and can broaden our view of what salutary roles nonjurisdictional rules can play.
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INTRODUCTION
How does one determine whether a particular rule is jurisdictional or not?
Over the last few years, the Court has focused on this question. Since 2004, the
Court has determined that Bankruptcy Rule 4004, which gives a Chapter 7
creditor sixty days after the first creditors’ meeting to object to debtor
discharge, 1 is nonjurisdictional; 2 that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
33(b)(2), which sets a time limit to file a motion for a new trial, 3 is
nonjurisdictional; 4 that Title VII’s “employee-numerosity requirement” 5 is a
nonjurisdictional element of the claim; 6 and that the time limit to extend the
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil lawsuit 7 is jurisdictional. 8 And, just a few
months ago, the Court decided that the six-year statute of limitations in the
Tucker Act is a quasi-jurisdictional bar to suit. 9
The Court is right to be attentive. Whether a rule is jurisdictional or not
affects both litigants and the courts in important ways. Though I believe that
the Court has yet to develop a principled framework for resolving the issue, 10
1. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a).
2. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 (2004).
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2).
4. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15-19 (2005) (per curiam).
5. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2000).
6. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-16.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000).
8. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
9. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).
10. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55
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the Court is correct to recognize the issue as an important one and to continue
to strive for a workable and sensible resolution.
But the jurisdictional inquiry also implicates another question of equal
importance, but that has received less attention and thought. What does the
determination that a rule is jurisdictional or not mean? For a jurisdictional rule,
the answer is (usually) easy. 11 A jurisdictional rule can be raised by any party
at any time, including for the first time on appeal; it obligates the court to
police compliance sua sponte; and it is not subject to principles of equity,
waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel. 12
By contrast, the effects of a nonjurisdictional characterization are far less
studied. Often, courts and commentators simply assume that nonjurisdictional
rules have all of the inverse effects of jurisdictional rules: that is, they must be
raised by a particular party by a particular time or they are forfeited; they are
subject to consent and waiver and estoppel; and they are subject to principles of
equity. Thus, some courts and commentators have assumed that if a rule has
any attributes of jurisdictionality, it must be jurisdictional, and that if a rule is
nonjurisdictional, then it must have no attributes of jurisdictionality. 13 In
addition, that assumption is made without any meaningful discussion of what
attributes the nonjurisdictional rule in question should have as an institutional,
analytical, or normative matter. 14 As I will explain, that assumption is wrong,
and reliance on it reflects a deep misunderstanding of, and underappreciation
for, nonjurisdictional rules.
This Article is the first to take a hard look at nonjurisdictional rules and the
important roles they can play. Part I illustrates how courts and commentators
have tended to confine nonjurisdictional rules to the mirror inverse of
jurisdictional rules, and it exposes this rigid treatment of jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional rules as a false dichotomy. Nonjurisdictional rules need not
have the opposite effects of jurisdictional rules—nor do they invariably in
practice. The point is that characterizing a rule as nonjurisdictional does not tell
us much about the rule’s effects, and identifying a particular jurisdictional
attribute of a rule does not tell us whether the rule is jurisdictional or not. As a
result, courts and commentators falling victim to this false dichotomy often
commit one of two errors. Either they erroneously mischaracterize a
nonjurisdictional rule as jurisdictional, or they erroneously mischaracterize a
nonjurisdictional rule as having no jurisdictional effects.
Part II argues that this false dichotomy also obscures the opportunity to
explore a more nuanced approach, in which a nonjurisdictional rule has some,
but not all, of the attributes commonly associated with jurisdictionality. As an

(2008) (developing such a framework).
11. See infra note 15.
12. See infra note 16.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19.
14. See infra note 17.
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example, this Part focuses on the importance of the oft-overlooked
“mandatory” rule, a species of nonjurisdictional rules that has both
nonjurisdictional and jurisdictional effects. A mandatory rule is susceptible to
waiver, forfeiture, and consent, and it need not be policed by the court sua
sponte. But it is, like jurisdictional rules, immune to equitable excuses for
noncompliance. The benefits of such a rule are important, though—
unfortunately—overlooked.
Part III argues that closer attention to nonjurisdictional rules with
jurisdictional attributes can have a positive doctrinal impact. Shedding the
blinders of the false dichotomy can help explain and conceptualize some of the
more curious doctrinal anomalies. State sovereign immunity is one example.
Though often characterized as a jurisdictional doctrine, it can be waived or
consented to. The false dichotomy separating nonjurisdictional rules from
jurisdictional rules has no place for this strange doctrine, and, as a result,
scholars and courts have struggled to explain it. But taking the blinders off
reveals that a mandatory characterization goes a long way towards reconciling
the anomaly and bringing some consistency to what has been a tortuous
doctrine.
I conclude by zooming out to a broader view. A greater appreciation for
nonjurisdictional rules with jurisdictional attributes can alleviate blind
adherence to the false dichotomy and potentially be a powerful tool for a richer
understanding of both complex and everyday doctrines.
I. UNDERSTANDING NONJURISDICTIONAL RULES
Nonjurisdictional rules are routinely misunderstood. If a court decrees a
rule to be nonjurisdictional, its next step often is not analytical at all, but
instead is formalistic: the court simply gives the nonjurisdictional rule the
inverse effects of jurisdictionality, without further analysis. As I explain in
more detail below, that dispensation is too facile.
A. Avoiding the False Dichotomy
Jurisdictional rules (usually) have clear and well-settled effects. 15 A
15. I say “usually” because there are at least three areas in which a jurisdictional rule’s
effects might be more complicated. First, the rule might be jurisdictional without implicating
subject-matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, for example, can be waived. Second, a
jurisdictional rule might have nonjurisdictional preconditions. Appellate jurisdiction, for
example, will not attach without a notice of appeal being filed, but what constitutes a notice
may be subject to some equitable flexibility. Third, a rule could be jurisdictional yet also
contemplate, either expressly or implicitly, the effects of equity or waiver. The deadline to
file a notice of appeal in a civil case, for example, may be jurisdictional, but the statute
governing that deadline specifically allows courts to extend it for certain equitable reasons.
See generally Scott Dodson, Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 228 (2008), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2008/02/
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jurisdictional rule can be raised by any party at any time, including for the first
time on appeal; it obligates the court to police compliance sua sponte; and it is
not subject to principles of equity, waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel. 16
By contrast, nonjurisdictional rules do not have the same rigid effects.
Nevertheless, courts and commentators have tended to express
nonjurisdictional rules as having the inverse effects of jurisdictional rules. 17
Even the Supreme Court has contributed to the trend. In Day v. McDonough,
the Court stated that nonjurisdictional deadlines are subject to waiver and
forfeiture and impose no obligation on courts to raise them sua sponte. 18
Thus, as Perry Dane has noted in the specific context of time prescriptions,
the characterization question “always rests on an explicit contrast. . . . [I]f a
time limit is jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it one way; if it is not
jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it another way.” 19 The assumption
behind the question is that a jurisdictional characterization has one set of effects
and a nonjurisdictional characterization has a wholly different set of effects.
This automatic characterization of nonjurisdictional rules as the inverse of
jurisdictional rules—that they are subject to waiver, consent, forfeiture, and
equitable exceptions and that they need not be raised (or cannot be raised) sua
sponte by the court—is erroneous.

appreciating-ma.html (exploring these possibilities). Both for simplicity’s sake and to focus
the discussion on the underexplored nonjurisdictional side of the equation, I will confine
“jurisdictional” to matters of subject-matter jurisdiction and avoid ruminating, at least for
now, on different species of jurisdictional rules.
16. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (stating that courts
have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even
if not challenged by any party); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456
U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (setting out characteristics of subject-matter jurisdiction).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 06-51399, 2007 WL 2693073, at *1 (5th Cir.
Sept. 10, 2007) (per curiam) (“[T]ime limits not imposed by statute are not jurisdictional.
The specific implication is that these time limits may be waived.” (internal citations
omitted)); Cook v. United States, No. 06-5276, 2007 WL 2566014, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 5,
2007) (“[J]urisdictional rules are mandatory; therefore, their time limits cannot be waived.
On the other hand, claim-processing rules are not jurisdictional—thus, their time limits can
be waived.” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); E. King Poor, Jurisdictional
Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 208 n.172 (2007) (“The importance of the distinction [between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional characterizations] was that non-jurisdictional deadlines
are subject to equitable exceptions, described as ‘waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.’”
(quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982))).
18. 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A statute of limitations defense . . . is not
‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.”
(emphasis in original)); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have repeatedly stated that the
enactment of time-limitation periods such as that in § 2244(d), without further elaboration,
produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture.”).
19. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 12 (1994).
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In truth, nonjurisdictional rules do not have so rigid a set of effects as
jurisdictional rules. Indeed, many nonjurisdictional rules exhibit some attributes
of jurisdictionality. For example, certain nonjurisdictional bankruptcy rules
may not be susceptible to consent or equitable exception. 20 Certain
nonjurisdictional criminal procedure rules have been characterized as
“inflexible,” suggesting that they are immune from equitable exceptions. 21 The
nonjurisdictional exhaustion requirement imposed on a state prisoner seeking a
federal writ of habeas corpus cannot be forfeited by the State or subject to
estoppel. 22 And federal courts may, in appropriate circumstances, raise a
petitioner’s procedural default sua sponte to bar habeas corpus review under the
nonjurisdictional independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, even if the
state forfeited the argument. 23 Courts may raise and decide many other
nonjurisdictional limits sua sponte. 24 And several commentators have picked
up on the idea that nonjurisdictional rules can be mandatory or nonwaivable. 25
As these examples show, nonjurisdictional rules are not inherently
prohibited from having jurisdictional effects. As a result, it is wrong to assume
that jurisdictional rules have one set of fixed effects and nonjurisdictional rules
have another. The dichotomy is simply false.
B. The Effects of the False Dichotomy
Adherence to the dichotomy has at least two consequences, both of which
lead to analytically inconsistent results. First, it obscures a middle path that
may be more accurate. For example, a rule might be nonjurisdictional yet
exhibit jurisdictional traits. The false dichotomy does not allow for such a rule
and therefore may lead to an incorrect result or doctrinal confusion.
Second, judicial adherence to the false dichotomy risks either over- or
underdeciding the case. Imagine, for example, a case that presents the question
20. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 457 n.12 (2004) (noting the possibility that a
debtor and creditor may not be able to stipulate to the assertion of time-barred claims when
their assertion would prejudice other creditors); id. at 457 n.11 (noting a split in the lower
courts as to whether equitable exceptions can excuse noncompliance with the deadline to
object to a debtor’s discharge).
21. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (characterizing Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 45(b) as “inflexible”).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2000).
23. Day, 547 U.S. at 206-07 (citing the unanimity of the circuits on this issue).
24. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (res judicata defense);
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (retroactivity); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (failure to prosecute); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947) (forum non conveniens).
25. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 19, at 39 (“First, legal rules can be mandatory without
being jurisdictional.”); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1457, 1497 (2006) (“Courts can still apply nonjurisdictional rules with rigidity and
decide, for example, that even if a particular rule is nonjurisdictional, it still cannot be
waived.”).
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of whether a rule is susceptible to equitable exceptions. A court that construes
the rule as jurisdictional might resolve the question but only by overdeciding it:
by characterizing the rule as jurisdictional, the court has silently resolved other
questions not presented (and likely never briefed), such as whether the rule
must be policed sua sponte by the court or whether the rule is subject to
equitable exceptions. On the other hand, a court that construes the rule as
nonjurisdictional but decides nothing further has underdecided the issue by
merely begging the question of what jurisdictional attributes (such as being
unsusceptible to equitable exceptions) the rule nonetheless might have.
Take, as an example of these problems, the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Bowles v. Russell, about which I will have more to say later. There,
Keith Bowles petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus, which the district
court denied. 26 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107, Bowles had thirty days to appeal. 27
He did not do so within that deadline. Instead, after the deadline had passed,
Bowles moved to reopen the time to file an appeal, 28 a motion authorized by
§ 2107. 29 The district court granted Bowles’s motion to reopen the time for
appeal on February 10, 2004. 30
In the district court’s order, the district court gave Bowles seventeen days,
until February 27, to file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, Bowles filed his
notice of appeal on February 26. 31 However, § 2107(c) limits a reopened time
period to fourteen days. 32 Thus, Bowles’s notice of appeal was timely under
the district court’s order but untimely under § 2107(c).
The State successfully moved to dismiss Bowles’s appeal, arguing that the
notice of appeal was untimely under § 2107(c) and that the Court of Appeals
therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Bowles sought certiorari review
in the Supreme Court, arguing that the deadline was not jurisdictional and that
the Court should excuse his noncompliance with the statutory deadline because
he relied on the district court’s order. 33
The Supreme Court agreed with the State and affirmed the decision of the
lower court in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Thomas. Relying primarily on
the statements of past cases, the Court held the rule to be jurisdictional. 34 And,
because the deadline was jurisdictional, it was not susceptible to the equitable
excuse proffered by Bowles. 35
26. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2362 (2007).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000); see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
28. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6).
30. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(6).
33. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
34. Id. at 2363 (“This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the
prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”).
35. Id. at 2366.
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As I have argued elsewhere, there are a number of good reasons to criticize
Bowles. 36 One reason, however, is particularly relevant here. The issue in
Bowles, in its narrowest sense, was whether the district court had the power to
extend the time to file the notice of appeal beyond the time set by § 2107(c) for
equitable reasons not recognized in the statute. But the issue the Court actually
considered was whether the statutory time limit was jurisdictional. True, in
answering “yes,” Bowles did resolve the narrower issue. But at the same time,
the Court also resolved other issues sub silentio that, though neither presented
by the facts nor addressed by the Court, necessarily follow from a jurisdictional
characterization. Thus, by declaring the deadline jurisdictional, Bowles requires
courts to police the deadline sua sponte, makes the deadline unsusceptible to
waiver, forfeiture, or consent, and allows noncompliance to be raised at any
time by any party—including the party who missed the deadline in the first
place. Although none of these issues was presented by the parties in Bowles or,
as far as I can tell, considered by the Court, the Court’s jurisdictional ruling
decided them anyway. And, as I will explain below, a more principled
consideration of them might have led to a different characterization.
For what it is worth, the dissent in Bowles fell victim to the same trap. The
dissent would have held the deadline nonjurisdictional and therefore amenable
to the equitable excuse presented in the case. 37 But a nonjurisdictional
characterization, rather than leading to that result, merely begs it. Not all
nonjurisdictional rules are amenable to equitable excuses, and there are good
reasons why the deadline to file a notice of appeal is one of those that is not. 38
Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent confronted directly the narrow
question presented, which was whether the deadline is mandatory (and
therefore not subject to equitable exceptions). Worse, neither the majority nor
the dissent even acknowledged the possibility of a middle path—that the rule
might be nonjurisdictional yet unsusceptible to equitable exceptions. The
Justices’ focus on the false dichotomy described above obscured that
possibility. That is a shame, for, as I will argue below, a mandatory but
nonjurisdictional characterization of § 2107 has much to commend it. 39
Bowles therefore illustrates the two perverse effects that the false
dichotomy engenders. First, the dichotomy focused the Court’s inquiry on a
question whose answer was either broader than necessary (the majority’s
jurisdictional characterization) or narrower than needed (the dissent’s
nonjurisdictional characterization) to resolve the case. And, second, it hid from
the Court a critical piece of the puzzle: the possibility that a rule might be
mandatory without being jurisdictional.
36. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 42, 46 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
2007/21/; Dodson, supra note 10, at 78 & n.126.
37. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. See Dodson, supra note 36, at 46.
39. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
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II. A ROLE FOR MANDATORY RULES
Had the Court in Bowles appreciated the nuances of jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional characterizations rather than focusing on the false dichotomy,
it might have avoided the problems identified above. 40 Convincing courts and
commentators to look outside the dichotomy is thus a laudable goal. As a step
toward that goal, I will show that the jurisdictional traits of nonjurisdictional
rules can have valuable and important roles to play. Take, as just one example,
the “mandatory rule.”
A. Mandatory Rules Defined
A mandatory rule is nonjurisdictional but nevertheless has the
jurisdictional attribute of being unsusceptible to equitable excuses for
noncompliance. 41 Thus, a mandatory rule has the nonjurisdictional attributes of
being waivable, forfeitable, and consentable, and a court has no obligation to
monitor it sua sponte. However, if the rule is properly invoked by the party for
whose benefit it lies, a court has no discretion to excuse noncompliance. 42

40. The Court has previously dispensed with a jurisdictional question in favor of a
narrower ruling. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (declining to
answer the question presented—whether the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s
sixty-day notice provision was jurisdictional—and instead resolving the narrower question
presented by the facts, namely whether the provision was amenable to equitable exceptions).
41. See Dodson, supra note 36, at 46-47. Note that my definition is critically different
than Justice Souter’s, who describes a mandatory rule as one that, while “enforceable at the
insistence of a party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it
may be waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable discretion.” Bowles, 127 S.
Ct. at 2368 (Souter, J., dissenting). I take this to mean that Justice Souter believes a
mandatory rule may be mitigated through the exercise of reasonable equitable discretion. I
disagree with that definition. Allowing a “mandatory” rule to be subject to equitable
discretion would render the “mandatory” moniker meaningless, for there would be nothing
“mandatory” about it.
42. I am of two minds as to whether a mandatory rule should generally allow or bar
equitable estoppel. The principle of equitable estoppel is that where one party has, by his
representations or conduct, induced the other party to give him an advantage that would be
against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he should not be permitted to avail
himself of that advantage in a court of justice. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S.
231, 234 (1959). On the one hand, equitable estoppel could be viewed as a form of waiver—
one that is implied or forced based on the equitable doctrine that a party’s own behavior has
deprived him of the right to benefit from the legal rule. See Dane, supra note 19, at 66-67.
On the other hand, equitable estoppel is actually the opposite of waiver because it arises only
when a party timely invokes the rule—it is only that equity deems the invocation ineffective.
While generally I can see both arguments, specifically I believe, as I discuss in more depth
below, that equitable estoppel should not be available in the context of state sovereign
immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 182-190.
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B. Institutional Benefits
The benefits of such a rule in theory should be obvious. Waiver, consent,
and forfeiture allow the parties to designate which issues require court decision
and which are of such relative unimportance to the parties that they would
rather forgo the costs of litigating them. They allow the parties to engage in
minisettlements during the litigation, trading the invocation of a mandatory rule
for a concession by the other side. They promote finality by ensuring that a
relatively unimportant rule that is waived and quickly forgotten will not rise
later on its own to unravel months’ or years’ worth of litigation and the settled
expectations and choices of the parties. And, they reduce the unfairness of
allowing the noncomplying party to raise her own default as a basis for
overturning an adverse result. In sum, mandatory rules further efficiency and
economy, encourage settlement, maintain finality, and promote fairness, all
while preserving litigant autonomy and the adversarial process. 43
In addition, a mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterization relieves the
court of the burden to police the rule sua sponte, an obligation that can impose
significant costs on a court. Free of that duty, a court need not monitor when
the rule’s requirement approaches and need not fret over whether the parties
have complied when it arises. Instead, the court need only address the rule if
the party for whose benefit it lies properly raises it, and the court can rely on
the parties to brief the issue. Thus, mandatory rules further accuracy and
conserve judicial resources by ensuring that the courts need only resolve the
issue when the parties have raised and briefed it.
Inflexibility—even in the face of equity—also has its virtues. Precluding
equitable excuses incentivizes compliance, maintains finality and reliance
interests, constrains judicial discretion and thus promotes fairness and equity
across cases, furthers the rule of law, and conserves judicial resources by
avoiding the need to litigate a host of potential equitable issues. 44 The primary
detraction is that the preclusion of equitable excuses might be harsh and unfair
in specific cases. But, at least in theory, some situations call for a rule that
elects inflexibility over equity.
Neither a jurisdictional rule nor a nonjurisdictional, nonmandatory rule can
boast of all of these benefits. That is not to say that a mandatory
characterization is warranted in every situation. To the contrary, other
situations may call for a jurisdictional rule, or perhaps for a nonjurisdictional
rule that must be policed by the courts on their own. But my point is that we
ought to break from the dichotomy to explore the various combinations
available in the middle of the road that occupy beneficial niches. Mandatory
43. Cf. Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV.
399, 419 (1986) (discussing similar benefits).
44. Cf. Dane, supra note 19, at 20-21 (“Strictly construed time limits create incentives
for compliance. They encourage repose and advance finality. They reduce the burden on
courts of deciding when leniency is in order.” (citation omitted)).
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rules are just the particular species I have chosen to illustrate this idea.
C. A Case Study: Section 2107
Practicality, however, is necessary to validate theory. I therefore propose
that a nonjurisdictional but mandatory characterization would have fit quite
well with the statutory deadline for filing a notice of appeal that was at issue in
Bowles. I will make both the nonjurisdictional case and the mandatory case for
characterizing the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil case. 45
1. Nonjurisdictional
Elsewhere I have developed a framework for determining whether a rule is
jurisdictional or not in the removal context, 46 and I think the analysis is
generally importable to the context here.
For such a statutory rule, a court first should consider whether Congress
expressly designed the rule as jurisdictional. If so, then courts should presume
the rule to be jurisdictional. After all, Congress is the branch with the
constitutional authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts, and a clear
statement of jurisdictionality should presumptively control. 47 For § 2107, there
is no clear statement of jurisdictionality. Congress directed that no notice of
appeal “shall” be brought unless filed within thirty days,48 but nothing suggests
that this word means “jurisdictional” as opposed to “mandatory.” 49 Congress
could have instead directed that “the appellate court shall have no jurisdiction
unless a notice of appeal is filed within thirty days,” but it did not in fact speak
in such jurisdictional terms. Thus, the presumption is inapplicable.
Absent a presumption, a rule could still be jurisdictional, but the character
will depend upon three other factors. First, what is the function or purpose of
the rule? Is the rule directed primarily at the power of the court and underlying
societal values such as federalism, or is it directed at the rights, obligations, or
conveniences of the parties? Is it to separate classes of cases, or is it to provide
a mode of procedure? Jurisdictional rules generally speak to the power of the
court or underlying societal values and separate classes of cases.
Nonjurisdictional rules, on the other hand, generally speak to the rights and

45. Unlike a court, which should worry about the dangers of overdeciding or
underdeciding the specific case before it, see supra text accompanying notes 36-38, I mean
to characterize the statute fully and for a broader purpose. I do not mean to suggest that the
Court should have followed my methodological approach wholesale in Bowles.
46. Dodson, supra note 10, at 66-78.
47. Id. at 66.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000).
49. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (holding nonjurisdictional Bankruptcy
Rule 4004(a), which prescribes that an objecting creditor “shall” file within sixty days).
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obligations of the parties and regulate the process or mode of the case. 50
This factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization of § 2107. The
purpose of the time limit is to provide notice of the appeal and discourage
litigation of stale issues. These primarily benefit the litigants rather than
broader societal interests. 51 This purpose is reinforced by the use of the phrase
“is filed” in the rule: “no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree . . .
unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days.” 52 Though in the passive
voice, the phrase “is filed” most sensibly speaks to the parties rather than to the
appellate court. It is true that a notice of appeal shifts power from a district
court to an appellate court, 53 but that shift is caused by the very existence of a
notice of appeal, not its timing. Also, while the deadline does separate appeals
filed in less than thirty days from appeals filed in more than thirty days, those
are not the kind of “classes of cases” that jurisdictional lines typically draw.
Rather, the deadline appears more directed towards requiring litigant action
than distinguishing between inherently different cases. In short, there is no
reason to think that the timing of the notice of appeal (at least as opposed to its
mere existence) has any jurisdictional function.
Second, courts should consider the effects of a jurisdictional or
nonjurisdictional characterization, including (1) the burdens on courts to
monitor compliance sua sponte, (2) the benefits of allowing parties to consent
to noncompliance, (3) the burden on the appellee to discover and prove
noncompliance, and (4) the resulting inefficiencies and equities of a particular
characterization. 54
This factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization of § 2107 as well.
The first and third effects basically cancel each other out. Dates are counted
fairly easily, and any extension must be applied for by motion. 55 Thus, the
burden on the court to monitor compliance on its own is relatively light and is
effectively the same as the burden on the appellee to discover and prove
noncompliance.
But the other effects more strongly point to a nonjurisdictional
characterization. Allowing the appellee to be able to consent to an extension of
the time to appeal permits the parties to choose to avoid litigating what
constitutes “excusable neglect or good cause,” 56 a determination that might
otherwise be fact-intensive, time-consuming, and difficult for the court.

50. Dodson, supra note 10, at 71-72.
51. Hall, supra note 43, at 399-400 (“[A]ppeal periods are like original jurisdiction
limitation periods: they involve primarily the interests of the immediate parties, not
fundamental societal interests.”); Lees, supra note 25, at 1496.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).
53. See Lees, supra note 25, at 1496 (arguing that power shifts support a jurisdictional
characterization).
54. Dodson, supra note 10, at 77.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (conditioning extensions on the filing of a motion).
56. Id. (allowing an extension “upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause”).
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Similarly, a jurisdictional characterization for a timing defect that happens to
go unnoticed may ultimately unravel a fully argued appeal, including even a
rehearing and rehearing en banc, wasting litigant and judicial time and
resources. On balance, the effects of the potential characterizations favor
applying a nonjurisdictional characterization.
Third, courts should consider doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency. 57
What characterization is most consistent with any historical treatment of the
doctrine at issue or its equivalents? For § 2107, this factor either is neutral or
supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. Although there is some language
in prior precedent that terms the deadline as “mandatory and jurisdictional,” 58
that precedent is far from clear or consistent. 59 In addition, the treatment of a
time limit to appeal as jurisdictional is in tension with the long tradition of
characterizing statutes of limitations as nonjurisdictional. 60
Taking all of these factors into consideration suggests that the time to file a
notice of appeal in a civil case under § 2107 is nonjurisdictional. But, as I have
argued, that a rule is nonjurisdictional does not make it nonmandatory.
2. Mandatory
There are good reasons for characterizing the deadline to file a civil notice
of appeal as mandatory (and therefore not amenable to equitable exceptions)
even if it is nonjurisdictional. First, Congress wrote that “no appeal shall [be
brought] . . . unless notice of appeal is [timely] filed.” 61 The word “shall,”
though not dispositive as to a jurisdictional characterization, normally does
create a mandatory obligation. 62
Second, Congress expressly provided specific and detailed exceptions—
excusable neglect or good cause—and strict time limits both for raising them
and for extending the time to appeal once an exception is met. 63 Its deliberate
choices suggest that lawmakers meant to restrain judicial discretion from going

57. Dodson, supra note 10, at 78.
58. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007).
59. See Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 63543 (2008).
60. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (characterizing statutes of limitations as waivable
affirmative defenses); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006); Irwin v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93-96 (1990); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 394 (1982); Lees, supra note 25, at 1491-98 (linking statutes of limitations to appeal
deadlines as support for a nonjurisdictional characterization of each).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).
62. See, e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26,
35 (1998) (stating that “the mandatory ‘shall[]’ . . . normally creates an obligation
impervious to judicial discretion”). But cf. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,
433 n.9 (1995) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers sometimes use, or
misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).
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beyond the parameters that Congress set forth. 64
Third, cases interpreting time limits for filing notices of appeal almost
uniformly have held them to be mandatory. 65 As I noted above, one should
question whether certain cases properly characterized the time limit to be
jurisdictional, 66 but they are on far firmer ground characterizing it as
mandatory. 67 And, the Court also has characterized as mandatory the time limit
for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case. 68 Thus, a mandatory
characterization would be fully consistent with prior decisions. 69
The balance of equities is a tougher call, for unique circumstances may
raise compelling arguments for the application of equity. 70 But, in my view,
those rare inequities are outweighed by the other justifications for a mandatory
characterization. The deadline serves the important purposes of discouraging
old and stale appeals and of promoting finality and reliance interests by setting
a definite point of time when litigation shall be at an end. 71 The resulting
salutary effects of characterizing the rule as mandatory—finality, predictability,
efficiency, and the rule of law—at least mitigate the harsh effects of particular
sympathetic situations. And they make it particularly unlikely that a mitigated
need for equity can outweigh the textual and precedential support for a
mandatory characterization noted above.
One practical difficulty of making the time to appeal forfeitable is that no

64. See, e.g., United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1998) (“Equitable tolling
is not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute. Here, the
QTA, by providing that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff
‘knew or should have known of the claim of the United States,’ has already effectively
allowed for equitable tolling. Given this fact, and the unusually generous nature of the
QTA’s limitations time period, extension of the statutory period by additional equitable
tolling would be unwarranted.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S.
347, 352 (1997) (“Section 6511’s detail, its technical language, the iteration of the
limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions,
taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned,
open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); Bank of Ala. v. Dalton,
50 U.S. 522 (1850) (interpreting a statute of limitations that includes specified exceptions to
exclude others).
65. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364-65 (2007) (citing precedent).
66. See supra text accompanying note 59.
67. See supra text accompanying note 59.
68. See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224-26 (1960) (characterizing a time
limit in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing a notice of appeal as “mandatory
and jurisdictional,” and holding the limit not subject to extension for reasons of excusable
neglect).
69. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in statutory interpretation cases
because Congress can alter the Court’s interpretations. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 700 (1992); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
70. Keith Bowles’s own reliance on an erroneous district court order is particularly
sympathetic. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 64 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/24/.
71. See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978).
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specific pleading mechanism sets a clear line for when a challenge to a tardy
appeal has been forfeited. 72 An easy solution, however, is to recognize a forfeit
from the failure to raise the defect in the initial opposition brief.
On balance, then, the deadline to file a notice of appeal is mandatory but
nonjurisdictional. 73
3. Some conclusions
As I mentioned above, Bowles should not have undertaken so elaborate an
inquiry. If the deadline to file a notice of appeal is in fact mandatory, then the
Court could have resolved the case by saying just that without ever tackling the
broader question of whether the rule is also jurisdictional. My purposes here are
quite different; I mean to show that there are good reasons to characterize
§ 2107 as a mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule and that such a
characterization has the potential for positive practical value.
III. MANDATORY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The previous Parts demonstrated that mandatory but nonjurisdictional rules
have a valuable role to play and that courts should apply them with greater
appreciation. But they did so in the context of cases already decided. To truly
demonstrate the value of a wide appreciation, I want to show how they might
resolve an undecided and very different question: how to characterize state
sovereign immunity.
That is a daunting task, for while the characterization approach of § 2107
was a somewhat ordinary case of statutory interpretation, state sovereign
immunity is not statutory and thus lacks the familiar grounding that statutes can
provide. But, though daunting, the task is necessary. Not all rules are statutory.
Some are court rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act, some are
prudential rules prescribed by the courts themselves, some are common law
rules, and some are constitutional or quasi-constitutional rules. A broader case
for a greater appreciation for the mandatory rule would be one in which a
governing text cannot be relied upon.
Enter the Eleventh Amendment, or, rather, to be more accurate under the
prevailing case law, state sovereign immunity. Simply stated, sovereign
immunity is the prerogative of a nonconsenting sovereign not to be sued. 74 Is
72. Hall, supra note 43, at 425.
73. Other commentators have agreed, though under a more cursory analysis. See, e.g.,
id. at 424.
74. I have oversimplified here for convenience. In reality, state sovereign immunity is
more convoluted; for example, it encompasses immunity from suits brought by private
individuals and foreign nations but not suits brought by other states or the federal
government. Compare Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (applying
immunity to suits by foreign nations), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (applying

DODSON 61 STAN. L. REV. 1

16

10/13/2008 4:25 PM

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

this rule jurisdictional? If not, is it nevertheless mandatory?
A. A Brief Background on State Sovereign Immunity
The historical acceptance of some form of sovereign immunity is ancient
and widespread. 75 Its rationale is logical from a monarchical view. The King
could not be compelled by his own laws against his will, for, as the absolute
font of the law, his refusal to submit would create a legal exception for
himself. 76 Likewise, the King could not be compelled by his own courts
regardless of the source of the law, for the King, as the highest figure of justice,
would then be inferior to his own tribunals. 77
At Independence, the new American states inherited the doctrine from
England, 78 but, as with other traditions, the colonists’ new notions of
sovereignty did not fit well with the traditional model, 79 for two reasons. First,
the revolutionaries rejected the absolute sovereignty of the King 80 and placed
immunity to suits brought by private individuals), with United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (refusing to apply immunity to suits brought by the United States),
and South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (refusing to apply immunity
to suits brought by a state), and United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (same as
United States v. Mississippi).
75. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 5
(1972) (“At least as early as the thirteenth century, during the reign of Henry III (12161272), it was recognized that the king could not be sued in his own courts . . . .”); Louis L.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2
(1963) (“By the time of Bracton (1268) it was settled doctrine that the King could not be
sued eo nominee in his own courts.”); see also Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527,
529 (1857) (“It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and
permission . . . .”).
76. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *243-51; see also Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.”). But see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97-98 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing this logic).
77. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *242 (“[N]o suit or action can be brought
against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For
all jurisdiction implies superiority of power . . . .”); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 103
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he King or Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in
its own courts.”); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979) (explaining sovereign
immunity on the basis that no tribunal could be higher than the King).
78. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (surmising that the doctrine “is
derived from the laws and practice of our English ancestors”).
79. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 115 (2000) (explaining that the Framers broke with
English tradition in a variety of ways, including English understanding of sovereignty).
80. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) (“Although we have adopted
the related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common law fiction that [the King can do no
wrong] was rejected at the birth of the Republic.”).
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that sovereign authority in the people themselves. 81 And, second, the new
government was federal, with both state and national governments, and with
the national government supreme over the states in certain matters. 82
Nevertheless, both the ratification debates and the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment confirm that the tradition was accepted in some form. The
ratification debates were particularly incendiary. The original Constitution
contained no mention of sovereign immunity, and leading opponents of
ratification argued that the Constitution would abrogate that sovereign
prerogative. 83
But prominent supporters of ratification assured the people that the states
would retain their prerogative not to be sued without their consent. Alexander
Hamilton wrote: “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent.” 84 And James Madison asserted,
“It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.” 85 Even John
Marshall, before becoming Chief Justice, stated, “I hope that no gentleman will
think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court . . . . It is not
rational to suppose that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court.” 86
And, when the Supreme Court held in Chisholm v. Georgia, 87 shortly after
ratification, that the Constitution abrogated that prerogative, 88 the states reacted
81. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); THE FEDERALIST NO.
22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the people are
“that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority”); id. NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison)
(“The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people . . . . [T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the
people alone . . . .”); id. NO. 49, at 313 (James Madison) (“[T]he people are the only
legitimate fountain of power . . . .”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that royal dignity is “inimical to the republican conception,
which rests on the understanding of its citizens precisely that the government is not above
the them, but of them, its actions being governed by law just like their own”); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-62, 404-10, 447-54,
463-65 (1969) (explaining that the revolutionaries and, later, the Federalists, located
sovereignty in the people rather than in the government).
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
83. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 429-31 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
(Brutus) (interpreting Article III to “subject[] a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of
an individual”); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES] (George Mason) (arguing that Article III enables “claim[s] against this state [to]
be tried before the federal court”); 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 41-42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (Federal
Farmer) (“[T]his new jurisdiction will subject the states . . . to actions, and processes . . . .”).
For a list of similar ratification sentiments, see Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State
Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 728 n.33 (2002).
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton).
85. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 533 (James Madison).
86. Id. at 555 (John Marshall).
87. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
88. Id.
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quickly to overturn the decision by constitutional amendment. An amendment
was proposed the day after Chisholm was issued. 89 During the ensuing
congressional recess, Massachusetts and Virginia called for a constitutional
convention to consider the suability of states in federal court. 90 Within a few
months, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and North Carolina all had joined in the
push for a convention. 91 Almost immediately after Congress reconvened, the
Senate introduced what was to become the Eleventh Amendment. 92 It passed
23-2 in the Senate 93 and 81-9 in the House. 94
The ratification debates and the swift and decisive overturning of Chisholm
provide powerful historical justifications for the recognition of state sovereign
immunity as an accepted part of American federalism. And, despite the
tensions between the doctrine’s foundations and a federal democratic
republic, 95 that acceptance has happened. 96 The open question is whether the
doctrine is jurisdictional or not, and, if not, whether the doctrine is mandatory.
B. The Case for a Nonjurisdictional State Sovereign Immunity
To make the case for a nonjurisdictional sovereign immunity, I rely on the
two-step framework used to characterize § 2107 above that begins with
consideration of a presumption of jurisdictionality and continues with three
additional factors. 97 Application of the framework provides much support for a
nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign immunity. 98
89. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101 (rev.
ed. 1937) (“[N]o State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the Judicial
Courts established or to be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate whether
within or without the United States.”).
90. See 1793 Va. Acts 52; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1931 (1983).
91. See JACOBS, supra note 75, at 65-66.
92. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794).
93. Id. at 30-31.
94. 4 id. at 476-78.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
96. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (“And while the exemption of
the United States and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to ordinary
actions in the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never
been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established
doctrine.”).
97. See supra Part II.C.1.
98. I sympathize with the view that sovereign immunity has aspects of personal
jurisdiction, see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002), and many of the arguments I make here might also support
such a characterization. I have not yet resolved how personal jurisdiction fits into the
jurisdictional characterization inquiry, and so, as I mentioned at the outset, see supra note
15, I have proceeded on the definition of “jurisdiction” as subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus,
that personal jurisdiction may appropriately characterize the doctrine of state sovereign
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1. Presumption of jurisdictionality
The first step is whether a clear statement of jurisdictionality from a
lawmaking authority raises a presumption of jurisdictionality. 99 Sovereign
immunity inheres in the very status of sovereignty, 100 and thus textual
manifestations, except in the cases of abrogation or waiver, 101 are rare. As a
result, there are few instances to apply the presumption.
The glaring exception is the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” 102
Were I analyzing only the Eleventh Amendment, I might conclude that the
presumption of jurisdictionality applies here. After all, its language, which
speaks directly to the court and restricts its “power,” strongly implies a
limitation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
But there are two reasons why that implication should be set aside here.
First, the Supreme Court has distanced itself from the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. In the Court’s view, the Eleventh Amendment is merely a
confirmation of the older principle of state sovereign immunity. 103 The words
of the Eleventh Amendment were meant only to overturn Chisholm. 104 In
effect, Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment cancel each other out, restoring
a textless doctrine of sovereign immunity. 105 The Court has not been shy about
adopting this view with respect to other terms of the Eleventh Amendment, 106
and so there is good reason to question rote adherence to the textual limitation
on “Judicial power.” 107 As the Court has said, “[t]his separate and distinct

immunity does not mean that “mandatory but nonjurisdictional,” as I have explained it, does
not as well.
99. Dodson, supra note 10, at 66-67.
100. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
its consent.”).
101. Congress may abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states by statute in certain
cases, see, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (allowing abrogation
under the Bankruptcy Clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (allowing
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment), and states themselves may waive their
immunity by state statute, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (stating that
many state statutes waive sovereign immunity for certain cases).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
103. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
104. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
105. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 722-23.
106. See Scott Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 393, 394 n.6
(2003) (citing cases).
107. I alluded to this in an earlier article. See Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier
of State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 777, 821 (2003) (“Perhaps the best resolution lies in
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structural principle [of state sovereign immunity] is not directly related to the
scope of the judicial power established by Article III.” 108
And, second, even if the Eleventh Amendment does erect a jurisdictional
bar for the immunity encompassed within its text, not all sovereign immunity is
captured by the Eleventh Amendment. There is broad agreement that states
have some kind of sovereign immunity from suits that do not fall within the
literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment. 109 Thus, most instances of sovereign
immunity are not based on the Eleventh Amendment at all and therefore have
little connection to its text.
These reasons counsel in favor of declining to apply the presumption and
instead considering the characterization of the doctrine through the other
factors.
2. Function
The first of those factors is the function of the doctrine. On the whole, this
factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization.
The primary function of state sovereign immunity—granting a state the
right not to be subject to a lawsuit at the insistence of an individual—speaks to
a right of a particular party, not to a limitation on the court’s power to hear the
case. And, a state can waive sovereign immunity or consent to suit, 110 features
that also support a nonjurisdictional function.
Confessedly, immunity is not clearly either a “mode of relief” or a “claimprocessing rule,” as many nonjurisdictional rules of procedure are, but neither
does sovereign immunity really “separate classes of cases” as rules of subjectmatter jurisdiction generally do. 111 The inability of sovereign immunity to fit
perfectly into one of those categories just means that that dichotomy is less
helpful to the characterization; it does not mean that the characterization cannot
rethinking the characterization of state sovereign immunity as a limitation on judicial power.
If it is indeed so completely divorced from the text of the Constitution as the Court has
intimated, it need not be bound by the Eleventh Amendment’s reference to a limit on ‘the
judicial Power,’ . . . .”).
108. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.
109. See Nelson, supra note 98 (distinguishing between Eleventh Amendment
immunity as subject-matter jurisdiction and non-Eleventh Amendment immunity as personal
jurisdiction); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 736 (“[T]he . . . text of the Amendment is not an
exhaustive description of the States’ constitutional immunity from suit.”); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116-17 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing a
nonconstitutional immunity outside of the Eleventh Amendment).
110. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1887); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (holding that a state’s voluntary removal to
federal court waives Eleventh Amendment immunity); Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (“[A] State can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection
and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case commenced or prosecuted against it.”).
111. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004) (setting out these
categories); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-55 (2004) (same).
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be made on the basis of other considerations. 112 Sovereign immunity is
directed at the right of a particular party, rather than the power of the court, and
on that basis, I am comfortable concluding that its function supports a
nonjurisdictional characterization.
There are contraindications, though they are weak. First, the logical
justification for sovereign immunity as applied in eighteenth-century England,
particularly the idea that the courts could not have jurisdiction over the King
because jurisdiction implies superiority in power, 113 does support a
jurisdictional characterization. But the logical justification was rejected by the
new American republic and has never been a justification for the doctrine in the
United States. 114 In addition, the Constitution expressly contemplates federal
jurisdiction over state defendants in certain cases, 115 and the Supreme Court
uniformly has upheld such exercise of jurisdiction. 116
Second, the text of the Eleventh Amendment—“The Judicial power shall
not extend” 117 —seems to speak to the power of the court rather than the rights
or obligations of the sovereign party. That also supports a jurisdictional
characterization. But, as I mentioned above, there are good reasons to set the
text of the Eleventh Amendment aside when discussing state sovereign
immunity. 118 And even were the Eleventh Amendment’s text to apply, it would
leave untouched a broad swath of cases in which non-Eleventh Amendment
state sovereign immunity could apply and in which the characterization of that
non-Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity must still be determined.
Third, immunity in federal court functions as a defense to the entire suit
rather than merely a defense to liability or certain relief.119 In that respect, state
sovereign immunity is unlike Scarborough v. Principi, 120 which characterized
as nonjurisdictional a rule pertaining to a particular “mode of relief” in a case
over which the court already had jurisdiction. 121 But not all exemptions from
112. See Dodson, supra note 10, at 71-77. (“To the extent that a particular issue that
arises is just too difficult to characterize as a claim-processing rule or one that separates
classes of cases, then this factor in the framework may be less helpful than the other factors,
but that does not mean that the framework as a whole cannot be effective.”).
113. See supra note 77.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. Of course, the dignity rationale also is
of questionable pedigree, see Dodson, supra note 107, at 780-808, but it does have the
additional force of express Supreme Court endorsement.
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending jurisdiction to suits between states).
116. See, e.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (refusing to
allow immunity from suit brought against a state by a state).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
119. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (calling the
doctrine “a sovereign immunity from suit”); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (stating that immunity is justified “in part by a concern
that States not be unduly burdened by litigation”).
120. 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
121. Id. at 413.
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suit are limitations on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 122 Other doctrines,
such as official immunity, are nonjurisdictional immunities from suit. 123 The
mere fact that the immunity is a bar to suit rather than to a remedy says little
about whether it is jurisdictional.
Fourth, state sovereign immunity does function to protect federalism
divisions, an institutional value that often calls for a jurisdictional
characterization in litigation between private parties. The reason institutional
protections such as federalism values often warrant a jurisdictional
characterization is that the private parties may not have adequate incentives to
protect them. 124
In the case of state sovereign immunity, however, the federalism angle cuts
the other way. The primary purpose of immunity is “to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” 125 In contrast
to a private individual, a party-state has a vested interest in protecting its own
dignity, and therefore the state’s ability to make choices that implicate
immunity stands on a very different footing than a private party’s ability to
make the same choices. In addition, the ability of the state to make such choices
is a vindication of, rather than an impingement on, the dignity of the state. 126
The same cannot be said when the choice is made by a private party.
It is possible that state sovereign immunity implicates other institutional
values besides respect for state dignity, but it is difficult to discern exactly what
122. See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 267 (calling the doctrine “a sovereign immunity
from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary’s subject-matter
jurisdiction”).
123. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-15 (2006) (holding the employernumerosity requirement of Title VII to be nonjurisdictional, even though an employer not
meeting the requirement would not be covered by the statute at all). Compare Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (stating that official immunity “is an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability”) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted),
with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (stating that official immunity is an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded).
124. See Dane, supra note 19, at 36-37 (“Commentators sometimes say that parties
cannot control jurisdictional issues because jurisdictional rules embody societal interests that
go beyond the interests of the parties and that none of the parties might have an adequate
incentive to advance. For example, both parties to a lawsuit might prefer their case to be
heard in a fast, efficient, clean federal court than in a slow, clumsy, dingy state court. But the
larger social interest in federalism might dictate otherwise.”); Hall, supra note 43, at 423
(referencing “important political principles that underlie the jurisdictional limits in a federal
system”).
125. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). A
secondary purpose is to protect the state fisc. See id. at 765 (“While state sovereign
immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the
States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens, the doctrine’s central
purpose is to accord the States the respect owed them as joint sovereigns.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 769 (“As we have previously noted, however, the
primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State treasuries, but to afford the
States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.” (citation omitted)).
126. See Dodson, supra note 107, at 820-23.
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they would be 127 and to understand why the states would not adequately
protect them as parties anyway. In any case, the primary purpose of protecting
state dignity should take precedence over whatever secondary federalism
effects happen to be implicated. 128
Thus, the primary function of state sovereign immunity—to provide a
particular state party a right to refuse to be a defendant—bespeaks a
nonjurisdictional rule rather than a jurisdictional rule. There are some
counterindications, but they are outweighed by (or, as to the purpose of
protecting state dignity, actually support) the stronger nonjurisdictional
functions. On balance, this factor supports a nonjurisdictional characterization.
3. Effects
The effects factor also supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. A
nonjurisdictional characterization would entail significant benefits of consent
and waiver with a relatively low impact on institutional federalism values. On
the flip side, a jurisdictional characterization has only marginal benefits and
burdens.
The ability of a state to waive immunity or consent to suit is an important
nonjurisdictional feature. The state legislature may wish to waive immunity in
an entire class of cases, such as discrimination cases. Or, the state may wish to
consent to a particular lawsuit from which it would otherwise be immune.
Public pressure or individualized considerations of fairness and justice may
motivate a state’s decision to waive or consent. On the other hand, equally
important concerns for the state fisc might justify a decision not to waive
immunity or consent to suit. 129 In short, the nonjurisdictional characteristics of
waiver and consent provide an opportunity for the states to strike a balance
between the legitimate concerns of suing a state and the need for redress of
injuries caused by the state. The importance of the ability to waive immunity or
consent to suit supports a nonjurisdictional characterization.
The downside is comparatively insubstantial. A federal court’s issuance of

127. See id. at 807 (questioning the federalism benefits of the dignity rationale);
Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1998) (“[T]he Court appears to be much more
concerned about preserving the dignity of the states—as if they were natural persons that
could experience hurt feelings beyond those of their residents—than in pursuing
decentralization and the other policy goals that federalism serves.” (citations omitted));
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-26 (1994). See generally Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism,
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002) (analyzing the impact of state sovereignty on federalism
values).
128. Dodson, supra note 10, at 59-61.
129. See Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 266 (2000) (noting that a state cannot simply declare
bankruptcy or limit spending only to profitable matters).
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a binding order on a sovereign state does implicate federalism concerns. But,
under the immunity doctrine, the federal court’s ability to do so is blessed by
the state itself through waiver or consent. It is therefore difficult to understand
why the effects on federalism are unduly severe. Self-interest would suggest
that a state would only subject itself to suit when federalism implications are
minor or significantly outweighed by other needs. In addition, to the extent
federalism values are supported by maintaining the dignity of the state, 130 it is
surely more consonant with state dignity to allow a state to waive immunity or
consent to suit than to disallow the state to do so when it so wishes. 131 Finally,
by creating a market for its consent or waiver, the state can maximize its
economic rewards, and the Supreme Court has upheld the propriety of a state
“selling” its waiver to the federal government for federal funds. 132 The upshot
to all this is that a nonjurisdictional characterization has significant benefits
because it allows the possibility of waiver and consent.
A jurisdictional characterization, on the other hand, might cause some
marginal costs and unfairness. For example, an entity whose state status is
unclear might wait until losing on the merits before asserting its sovereign
immunity. 133 At that point, the district court or appellate court would have to
determine whether the entity is an arm of the state entitled to immunity after a
judgment on the merits. Raising a jurisdictional issue late in the case, after a
merits determination, flips the natural order of the proceedings and may cause
an unraveling of the entire case, resulting in wasted judicial and litigant
resources and uncertainty at the outset.
It seems unlikely, however, that a state entity would hide the ball in that
way very often. Immunity would preclude the suit altogether, and any denial of
immunity would be immediately appealable. 134 Therefore, if the entity has any
basis to claim state status, it has little to gain by asserting immunity only late in
the proceedings. 135 It is, therefore, unlikely that a jurisdictional
130. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
131. See Dodson, supra note 107, at 820-23.
132. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (stating that Congress may induce
immunity waivers through Spending Clause legislation).
133. See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State
Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 290-91 (2002)
(arguing that, as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction, states may assert sovereign immunity
for the first time even on a collateral attack to the judgment).
134. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993).
135. Two cases illustrate the likely rarity of such delay. In Northern Insurance Co. of
New York v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189 (2006), the plaintiff insurance company sued a
Georgia county for negligent operation of a drawbridge. The county immediately moved for
summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds, even though it was not an arm of the
state. Id. at 192. The county’s conduct demonstrates the willingness of quasi-state entities to
claim immunity even if their justifications for the claim are doubtful. The other case,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), may be the exception that proves the rule. There,
the plaintiff sued a state officer for declaratory and injunctive relief. It was not until the
plaintiff prevailed and the court issued an order against the state officer that the state officer
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characterization would waste many resources.
However, the benefits of a jurisdictional characterization are not
appreciable, either. It is true that a jurisdictional characterization would save
courts from delving into questions of equity or waiver, but it does not appear
that those issues are often contested or difficult to resolve. 136 On balance, the
jurisdictional costs probably negate the jurisdictional benefits. In light of the
neutral effect of a jurisdictional characterization, the significant benefits of the
availability of waiver and consent tip this factor in favor of a nonjurisdictional
characterization.
4. Doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency
The last factor, doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency, also supports a
nonjurisdictional characterization. Although the Supreme Court has never
categorically characterized state sovereign immunity as jurisdictional or
not 137 —though it has come close in conflicting pronouncements 138 —a
jurisdictional characterization would undermine the longstanding tradition of
allowing the state to consent to suit 139 or otherwise waive its immunity. 140
Even in its English roots, the sovereign could waive sovereign immunity, 141
appealed and asserted sovereign immunity from part of the judgment. Id. at 677-78. The
Court allowed the assertion of immunity for the first time on appeal. Id. However, there was
good reason to do so. The suit ostensibly was permitted by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), at the outset; it was not until the district court ordered retroactive monetary payments
that the state officer asserted immunity from such payments as not covered by the Young
exception. Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed only that part of the order. Edelman, 415
U.S. at 678. Had the state officer understood that retroactive payments were sought, it is
likely he would have asserted the immunity defense at the outset as well.
136. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002)
(adopting general waiver principles as a basis for a federal common law of sovereign
immunity waiver); id. at 623-24 (disagreeing that the waiver rule adopted is confusing or
unclear).
137. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391-92 (1998) (“Even making
the assumption that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject-matter
jurisdiction—a question we have not decided . . . .”).
138. Compare Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997)
(calling it “a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal
judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction”), with Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78 (stating that state
sovereign immunity “sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need
not be raised in the trial court”).
139. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (“Many States, on their own
initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits.”); Great N. Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944) (proclaiming that immunity is “mitigated by a sense of
justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the sovereign”).
140. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 616 (holding that a state’s removal to federal court
constituted waiver); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (“The immunity from suit
belonging to a state . . . is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure . . . .”).
141. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *243 (“If any person has, in point of
property, a just demand upon the King, he must petition him in his court of chancery, where
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and the several states’ ability to waive sovereign immunity has always been
recognized in America. 142 The availability of waiver, which ordinarily is not
allowed for rules that limit subject-matter jurisdiction, 143 is more consistent
with a nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign immunity than a
jurisdictional characterization. 144
In addition, the Court’s development of the sovereign immunity doctrine
has three other features that are in tension with a jurisdictional characterization
of the doctrine. First, courts need not police and raise state sovereign immunity
sua sponte, 145 unlike most jurisdictional defects. 146 Second, immunity does not
apply when the suit is against a state officer alleged to have violated federal
law, so long as the suit is for prospective, injunctive relief only. 147 This
exception is in tension with a strict jurisdictional bar. Third, the availability of
immunity depends upon the status of the plaintiff. For example, if the plaintiff
is a sister state or the United States, there is no state sovereign immunity from
suit. 148 For these reasons, doctrinal consistency supports a nonjurisdictional
characterization.
As for cross-doctrinal consistency, there are several potential analogues to
other doctrines, 149 but the closest is federal sovereign immunity. Federal
sovereign immunity is, at least according to the Court, jurisdictional. In United
States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 150 the United States filed a claim on

his chancellor will administer right, as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion.”); see
also Banker’s Case, 14 Howell’s State Trials 1 (1700); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 460 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (restating the English practice).
142. See supra note 140.
143. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978);
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 148, 149
(1834).
144. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 127-28 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
145. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
146. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (stating that
courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even if not challenged by any party).
147. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (establishing the exception);
see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (limiting
Young to violations of federal law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (limiting
Young to prospective, nonmonetary relief).
148. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (refusing to allow
immunity from suit brought against a state by a state); see also United States v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 128 (1965) (refusing to allow immunity from suit brought against a state by the
United States); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (same).
149. Official immunity for police officers and other state officials acting in the scope
and discretion of official duties, a possible analogue, is nonjurisdictional. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
150. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
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behalf of Indian tribes for unpaid royalties due on mining leases against a coal
mining company, a debtor in a bankruptcy reorganization. The coal mining
company counterclaimed, seeking an amount that exceeded the United States’
claim. 151 Federal sovereign immunity law allows counterclaims as “set-offs”
against an original claim by the United States but bars any excess that would
amount to a monetary award against the United States. 152 The United States
failed to assert immunity against the counterclaim, however, and the
bankruptcy court approved both claims, leaving the United States with a
negative recovery against the coal mining company. 153 Subsequently, the
United States brought the same suit against the mining company’s surety, and
the surety moved to dismiss based on res judicata. 154 The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding the bankruptcy judgment void for lack of jurisdiction.155
Thus, a court lacks jurisdiction over a claim against the United States even if
the United States never asserts immunity in that case. The jurisdictional status
of federal sovereign immunity was recently confirmed in United States v.
Mitchell. 156
The jurisdictional character of federal sovereign immunity provides some
support for a jurisdictional characterization of the analogous state sovereign
immunity. Were the other factors less indicative of a contrary characterization,
the cross-doctrinal support of federal sovereign immunity might tip the scales.
But, here, the character of federal sovereign immunity must be weighed against
the function and characterization effects of state sovereign immunity, which
point towards a nonjurisdictional characterization.
In addition, important differences between federal sovereign immunity and
state sovereign immunity weaken the analogical support. Unlike the states, the
federal government did not surrender any immunity at ratification. Also unlike
the states, the federal government occupies a role in our federal system more
amenable to traditional sovereign immunity. It is more consonant with the role
of the federal government to assert traditionally jurisdictional immunity than
for the states. 157

151. Id. at 512-15.
152. See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT §§ 8.12-.13
(4th ed. 2006).
153. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 309 U.S. at 513-15.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“[T]he existence of consent [or waiver] is a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.”).
157. The Court has recognized that differences between federal sovereign immunity
and state sovereign immunity may justify their differential doctrinal development. See, e.g.,
Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 542-43 (2002) (declining to construe
state sovereign immunity doctrine consistently with federal sovereign immunity doctrine on
an issue of limitations). But see Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) (calling federal sovereign immunity “obviously the
closest analogy” to state sovereign immunity in the waiver context).
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On balance, then, while there are good reasons to seek consistency between
federal sovereign immunity law and state sovereign immunity law, 158 the other
factors supporting a nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign
immunity likely outweigh the importance of cross-doctrinal consistency.
C. The Case for a Mandatory Sovereign Immunity
The case for characterizing state sovereign immunity as nonjurisdictional is
only part of the inquiry. A nonjurisdictional characterization does not inform
what jurisdictional characteristics the doctrine does or does not have.
Determining that is the next task, and, as I will show, I believe a case can be
made for a mandatory characterization.
The jurisdictional characterization inquiry already established that the
doctrine should be susceptible to waiver and consent. Waiver and consent
coincide with the function of the doctrine and its dignity rationale. 159 They
allow for the salutary effects of striking a balance between the importance of
redressability for wrongs and important policy considerations involving the
state and its fisc. 160 And, they have been part and parcel of state sovereign
immunity since the beginning of its long historical acceptance. 161 These are
powerful reasons why waiver and consent should be features of a
nonjurisdictional state sovereign immunity doctrine.
But the aptness of other features is less clear. There are at least three other
features to consider: (1) whether the presence of immunity must be policed and
raised by the court sua sponte; (2) whether immunity cannot be forfeited by the
state; and (3) whether equitable considerations can prevent the invocation of, or
circumvent the application of, state sovereign immunity. I think there are good
reasons to answer all of these in the negative.
1. No sua sponte requirement
Must the existence of sovereign immunity as a bar to suit be raised by the
court sua sponte if no party raises it? The answer is no, for three reasons. First,
if the doctrine is nonjurisdictional, then there are few institutional reasons for
the court to take an independent interest in immunity, and, generally, the parties
should consider the underlying values adequately. Second, any noninstitutional
reasons for the court to raise the issue on its own (such as the need to ensure
that any consent, waiver, or forfeiture is voluntary and otherwise valid) are
unlikely to be so important as to require sua sponte invocation by the court,

158. Of course, cross-doctrinal consistency also could be achieved by rethinking the
jurisdictional status of federal sovereign immunity.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 125-28.
160. See supra text accompanying note 129.
161. See supra note 139.

DODSON 61 STAN. L. REV. 1

October 2008]

10/13/2008 4:25 PM

MANDATORY RULES

29

particularly when balanced against the burden on the court to be forced to
address the issue in each case. And, third, the Court itself has suggested that
there is no sua sponte requirement. 162
That is not to say that a court may never raise the issue on its own. 163
There may be compelling reasons to do so in individual cases. For example, if
it is unclear whether an entity is an arm of the state entitled to assert immunity
or not, and the court cannot determine if the entity is consenting to suit or
merely does not realize that it may be able to assert immunity, then a court may
wish to raise the issue to determine whether or not the entity is truly consenting
to suit. But these situations are more likely to come up on a case-by-case basis
and should not entail a blanket requirement. It is far better, and more consonant
with the underlying policies, to allow courts discretion to raise the issue when
the need arises. In sum, courts should not be required to raise the immunity
issue sua sponte.
2. Forfeitability
Forfeiture and waiver are slightly different. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a right; forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of
the right. 164 May immunity be forfeited by a state entitled to assert it? The best
answer is yes, in my view, though arguments to the contrary are not without
some merit.
There are good reasons why immunity should be forfeitable like any other
affirmative defense. Requiring the defense to be asserted in a timely fashion,
such as in the answer, allows the issue to be litigated at the outset, potentially
avoiding the waste of judicial and litigant resources if it is asserted late in
litigation or for the first time on appeal. Also, requiring a timely assertion
prevents the state from intentionally delaying the assertion for some tactical
advantage. In addition, it promotes clarity, consistency, and fairness in the
litigation. 165 And, finally, if immunity exists in substantial part to protect states
from the burdens of suit, it makes logical sense to require the defense to be
raised as early in the litigation as possible.
If immunity were difficult to determine, I might rethink forfeiture. After
all, state sovereign immunity is designed to ensure respect for the states, and a
rule that requires a decision whether or not to assert immunity at an early stage

162. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
163. Cf. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006) (allowing courts to raise the
untimeliness of habeas petitions on their own even though the time bar is nonjurisdictional
and does not require them to do so).
164. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004) (acknowledging the distinction).
165. Cf. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002)
(suggesting that these are values that ought to be considered in immunity jurisprudence).
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in the litigation when that decision cannot yet be made does not show much
respect for the states and the doctrine of immunity. But the availability of
immunity should be, in the vast majority of instances, readily apparent at the
outset. Even if the availability of immunity is unclear, an entity usually can—
and will have ample incentive to—assert the defense early anyway. 166
There are two practical arguments against forfeiture, but they strike me as
fairly weak. The first is that a no-forfeiture rule would protect those state
entities that erroneously believed that they were not entitled to assert immunity
but suddenly realized their mistake before the litigation ended but after the
forfeiture deadline had expired. A no-forfeiture rule for those cases might
enable a court to resolve whether the state entities had consented to suit
voluntarily. 167
But, as I mentioned above in the context of the sua sponte discussion, these
cases strike me as very rare indeed, 168 and, to the extent they arise, defendants
already have the opportunity to amend their answers to assert affirmative
defenses previously omitted if justice so requires. 169 The risk that a
nonconsenting state entity will unknowingly forfeit an available immunity
defense and be unable to assert it, particularly with the opportunity of a court to
raise the issue sua sponte, 170 seems extremely low and provides very little
support for a no-forfeiture rule of state sovereign immunity.
The second practical argument is that states may need time to consider
carefully whether to waive immunity or not in specific cases, a decision that
may not be able to be made without information from the discovery process.
Respect for the states and their prerogative to invoke or waive immunity
counsels against a strict and early forfeiture rule.
This argument has some merit, but it is not clear to me, as an empirical
matter, whether such situations come up often enough to justify it. Even if so,
there is an easy solution: a state should assert the immunity defense in its
answer but decline to move to dismiss the case before discovery 171 and,
instead, after discovery has closed, either waive immunity or move for
summary judgment. 172 The point is that the state can preserve its immunity
against forfeiture by asserting it in a timely fashion but need not seek dismissal

166. See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189 (2006)
(entertaining the assertion of sovereign immunity by a county whose ability to invoke
immunity was unclear).
167. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2000) (eliminating the forfeitability of the habeas
exhaustion requirement to ensure that waiver was proper).
168. One possible exception is Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See supra
note 135.
169. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a); cf. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006)
(recognizing the utility of Rule 15 to assert defenses otherwise forfeited).
170. See supra text accompanying note 162.
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
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on the basis of immunity until it is ready to do so.
The strongest argument in favor of a no-forfeiture rule is precedent.
Although the Court has never said whether state sovereign immunity may be
forfeited, two decisions hint otherwise. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 173 the Court allowed a state to assert sovereign immunity in a federal
case for the first time on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 174 Ford implicated
both waiver and forfeiture. The waiver issue was whether the attorney general
had authority to waive the state’s immunity through his litigation conduct in the
lower federal courts. The forfeiture issue was whether, independent of waiver,
the state could be barred from asserting immunity because it did not do so in a
timely fashion.
Ford decided both issues in favor of the state’s retention of immunity.
Ford held that the attorney general lacked authority to waive state immunity
though litigation conduct. 175 The Court overruled that holding in Lapides v.
Board of Regents, holding instead that an attorney general can waive the state’s
immunity through his litigation conduct. 176
But Ford also decided the forfeiture issue:
The objection to petitioner’s suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment
was first made and argued by Indiana in this Court. This was in time, however.
The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court
will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even though
urged for the first time in this Court. 177

Lapides did not overrule this forfeiture aspect of Ford.
Similarly, in Edelman v. Jordan, 178 the Court allowed the State to assert
immunity successfully even though the State invoked immunity for the first
time on appeal. 179 The Court stated: “[I]t has been well settled since [Ford]
that the Eleventh Amendment sufficiently partakes of the nature of a
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court.” 180
Ford and Edelman provide some support for a no-forfeiture rule of state
sovereign immunity, but they are not unequivocal. A plausible reading of those
cases is that, assuming immunity may be forfeited, forfeiture will be narrowly
construed and the time limit to forfeiture may be quite long depending upon the

173. 323 U.S. 459 (1945), overruled by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of
Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 469.
176. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623 (overruling Ford).
177. Ford, 323 U.S. at 467.
178. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
179. See id. at 677-78 (considering the defense, though it was raised for the first time
on appeal).
180. Id.
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circumstances. 181 In addition, it is clear that both Ford and Edelman premised
their holdings on the jurisdictional nature of state sovereign immunity.
Reconsidering that jurisdictional premise in the careful and nuanced way that I
propose here may undermine the skepticism of forfeiture evinced in Ford and
Edelman.
Ultimately, equivocal precedent should not stand in the way of the strong
formalist and functional reasons for allowing state sovereign immunity to be
forfeited. But it is a close call. And, if I am wrong, then I happily revert to my
broader point: regardless of the specific balance struck here, we need a more
nuanced lexicon to deal with doctrines like state sovereign immunity.
Regardless of whether a mandatory characterization or some other
characterization ultimately carries the day, the point is that some middle path
provides a different, and perhaps better, way to conceptualize the doctrine.
3. No availability of equity
The final jurisdictional-like attribute to consider is the availability of equity
to prevent an assertion of the immunity bar. Although a closer call, I think a
persuasive argument can be made that state sovereign immunity resists
application of equity.
The availability of equity does not implicate the Ex parte Young doctrine.
The Young doctrine allows a person otherwise barred by immunity to sue a
state official for violations of federal law for prospective injunctive or
declaratory relief. 182 The Young doctrine does not hinge on the need for equity,
however. The Young doctrine relies on the fiction that a state official is stripped
of his state immunity when he violates federal law. 183 An award of money
damages would be, in effect, an award against the state when the fiction
dictates that the state is not the real party in interest in the suit against the
stripped officer. 184 Thus, the distinction between injunctive relief and money
damages protects the unconsenting state, which, under Young, is still cloaked
with immunity, from being effectively the real party in interest to an officer
suit.
Later decisions have reinforced the fact that Young is not a decision based
in equity. In Edelman, the Court struck down retrospective injunctive monetary
relief, despite its characterization as “equitable restitution,” because the award
would have come from the state fisc. 185 The Court stated:
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court to

181. Edelman, in particular, may have had good reason to allow the tardy assertion.
See supra note 135.
182. See supra note 147.
183. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
184. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
185. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-68.
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indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no
matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out
of the state treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled “equitable” in
nature. 186

In other words, the Young doctrine does not subject immunity to the whims
of equity. Rather, it arises from the need to end ongoing violations of federal
law. The Young doctrine does not address the applicability of equity to state
sovereign immunity.
Equity may, however, come into play in the state’s otherwise proper
assertion of immunity. In other words, might there be equitable reasons why a
court could hear a claim against a nonconsenting state despite its otherwise
proper invocation of immunity? 187
Two reasons suggest that the answer is no. First, the Court’s stringent
waiver rules indicate that anything outside of a clear and voluntary waiver or
declaration of consent will not deprive a state of its immunity right. For
example, a state’s consent to suit is valid only if the consent was clear and
unambiguous. 188 In addition, waiver based on a state’s conduct will be applied
only if the state voluntarily invokes the court’s jurisdiction. 189 Finally, waivers
that are coercive—that are obtained via a stick rather than a carrot—are not
binding on the state. 190 These cases suggest that equitable estoppel, to the
extent that it is a kind of implied waiver or consent, should not be available to
prevent a state from asserting immunity.
Second, immunity is inherent in sovereignty, and, as a result, is of a
mandatory and inflexible nature. The sovereign interests served by state
sovereign immunity—deference to state dignity and protection of the state
fisc—transcend notions of fairness that arise in the context of a specific
litigation. (Indeed, they transcend notions of fairness in general by preventing

186. Id. at 666; see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282-88
(1997) (refusing to apply the Young doctrine to a suit seeking prospective equitable relief
that was the functional equivalent to a quiet title action against the state).
187. See Pemrick v. Stracher, No. 92 CV 959(CLP), 2007 WL 1876504, at *8 n.16
(E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007) (assuming that equitable estoppel could prevent a state from
asserting immunity but finding that its application was unwarranted by the facts of the case);
Hoskins v. Kaufman Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 303CV0130D, 2003 WL 22364356, at *1
n.2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003) (avoiding the issue).
188. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984);
Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
189. Compare Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620
(2002) (finding waiver where the state removed the case to federal court), and Porto Rico v.
Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 631 (1914) (finding waiver where Puerto Rico petitioned to become a
party), with Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 675-76 (1999) (abolishing the doctrine of constructive waiver of immunity based on a
state’s participation in a federal regulatory scheme), and Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441
(1900) (refusing to find consent to suit in federal court based on a state’s consent to suit in
state court).
190. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 687.
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an injured citizen from recovering against the state that wrongfully caused the
injury.) They ought not be subject to the whim of circumstances or the parties’
actions, save where those actions manifest a valid waiver or consent by the
state.
In sum, a good argument can be made that state sovereign immunity might
best be characterized as nonjurisdictional. Its principal function is to bestow a
right upon a party rather than to limit the power of the courts. The availability
of waiver and consent is an important and consistent corollary to sovereign
immunity. And precedent is in tension with a jurisdictional characterization.
These features all support a nonjurisdictional characterization of state sovereign
immunity. In addition, good arguments support a mandatory characterization.
The availability of waiver and consent, as just stated, are important and
consistent components of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity need not be
policed by the courts sua sponte, but it ought to be subject to forfeiture. Finally,
the invocation of immunity should resist equitable constraints. For these
reasons, we should consider characterizing state sovereign immunity as a
mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule.
CONCLUSION
At one level, the goal of this Article is modest: to show why we need a
deeper consideration of nonjurisdictional rules and a greater appreciation for
their various manifestations, particularly mandatory rules. For statutes like
§ 2107, the case is somewhat straightforward. A mandatory but
nonjurisdictional characterization fits well with its statutory paradigm, purpose,
effects, and precedent—far better even than the other characterizations offered
by the Bowles majority and dissent.
Going beyond statutes, however, taps into something much broader and
more complex. As I have tried to show with state sovereign immunity, a
willingness to embrace a middle path—such as mandatory rules—may provide
additional avenues for conceptualizing and characterizing nonstatutory
doctrines, which often are more amorphous and uncertain than their statutory
counterparts. There are a host of them to consider. Prudential standing, 191
appellate certification, 192 and exhaustion 193 are just a few. These doctrines
191. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nancy E. ex rel. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding prudential standing requirements to be nonjurisdictional).
192. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (per curiam) (“[U]nder AEDPA, he
was required to receive authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his second
challenge. Because he did not do so, the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain
it.”).
193. The Court has avoided resolving whether appellate exhaustion is jurisdictional.
See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 90 (1997); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
533 (1992); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79 (1988). But see Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) (stating that the Court can decide issues that were not
presented below when the respondent does not object, the issue was squarely presented and
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ought not get stuck in the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional false dichotomy that
has trapped others. A greater appreciation for nonjurisdictional rules in general
(and mandatory rules specifically) may provide a way out, as well as an
opportunity to think more broadly about these doctrines and to give them a
richer, more nuanced, character.
At bottom, this Article is not so much about arguing for a specific
characterization of state sovereign immunity or § 2107. After all, though I think
the arguments for the mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterizations are
strong, I am not so utterly convinced of them that I can rule out being
persuaded otherwise. Rather, the broader goal is to develop more creative
thinking about these difficult characterization issues, to open our minds to the
myriad of possibilities that exist for them, and to resolve them with both
honesty and principle.

fully briefed, and it was an important, recurring issue).
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